UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1995/530
30 June 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 29 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should be grateful if you would have the attached texts concerning Burundi circulated as a document of the Security Council:

(a) Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union, which was issued in Paris and Brussels on 23 June 1995;

(b) European Union statement adopted by the European Council at Cannes on 24 June 1995.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MÉRIMÉE

95-19770 (E) 030795 030795 050795

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Annex I

[Original: English and French]

Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning Burundi

(Paris and Brussels, 23 June 1995)

Three months after setting out its objectives and priorities with regard to Burundi (Carcassonne statement of 19 March and common position of 24 March 1995), the European Union commends the efforts being made by the leaders of the country - in particular the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister - to restore confidence, as well as the resolute action by the special representatives of the secretaries-general of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

It is nevertheless increasingly concerned at the proliferation of acts of violence and the destabilizing activities of extremists on all sides. It vigorously condemns such acts and deplores the excessive number of victims. It condemns the behaviour of certain military units during disarmament operations in areas of Bujumbura and points, in this connection, to the Burundi Government's responsibility for the proper conduct of such operations.

It reaffirms that the situation can return to normal only if there is respect, and support from all sections of the population, for the Government convention of 10 September 1994 establishing the conditions for power-sharing, as pointed out by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister in their joint statement of 30 March 1995.

In this connection, it takes note of the special measures announced by the President of the Republic on 18 June, which show the authorities' resolve to restore order, while hoping that they will be implemented in strict compliance with human rights.

The unreserved commitment of all the Burundi people and of the international community is needed if this serious crisis is to be overcome.

The European Union remains determined to give its resolute support to the efforts of the Burundi authorities to restore peace and their action against all trouble-makers. It reaffirms its opposition to extremists.

The decisions taken by the European Union in support of the process of national reconciliation are being implemented:

(a) Support is being provided for increasing the staff of the OAU observer mission;

(b) Assistance for the dispatch of human rights experts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is being prepared;

(c) The aid requirements for rebuilding the legal system have been identified;

(d) The action plan for assistance to refugees, displaced and repatriated persons, adopted in Bujumbura, can be implemented with the assistance of the European Union;

(e) The principle of a round table of providers of funds has been the subject of a protocol of agreement complete with time limits between the United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Burundi. It is now for the Government to draw up a clear programme of economic and social recovery to be placed before the fund providers;

(f) Measures banning travel by extremists to the member States are being applied.

The European Union considers that the States in the region have a particular responsibility and it urges them, together with all States in the international community, to support the stabilization efforts made by the Burundi authorities and to take the measures required to prevent the arming and movement of extremists.

The European Union reaffirms the need for a well-prepared regional conference, as soon as possible, under the aegis of the United Nations, on peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region, since a conference of this kind is the only means of reducing the deep-seated causes of instability in the region.

Annex II

[Original: English and French]

European Union statement on Burundi

(Cannes, 24 June 1995)

The European Council is seriously concerned at the continuing deterioration in the situation in Burundi. It expresses its full support for the Burundi authorities' efforts to achieve national reconciliation and restore order, provided that human rights are fully respected. It condemns all acts of violence and attempts at destabilization by extremists of every hue. It reaffirms the European Union's readiness to continue its steadfast support for Burundi throughout these trying times.

The European Council wants a conference on peace, security and stability in the region of the Great Lakes to be convened as soon as possible under the aegis of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

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S/1995/531
30 June 1995

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Items 92 and 114 (c) of the
preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES OF CROATIA
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL
RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 30 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you concerning the letter addressed to you by Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", of 13 June 1995 (A/50/219-S/1995/482) and, upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to state the following.

In his letter, Mr. Jovanovic charges that the operation of the Croatian territorial defence and police forces in the western part of the Slavonia region of the Republic of Croatia represented a flagrant violation of all relevant Security Council resolutions. The fact is that the above-mentioned security action constituted a response to terrorist attacks, killings and kidnapping of Croatian citizens, as well as to the decision of the local Serb authorities to close down the Zagreb-Lipovac highway. These actions by local Serbs constituted a gross violation of both the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 (S/1994/367, annex) and the economic agreement of 2 December 1994 (S/1994/1375, appendix I). As a result, the Republic of Croatia acted as any other sovereign State would under the circumstances in order to safeguard the lives of its citizens and to restore order on its territory.

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

However, the manner in which Mr. Jovanovic describes the legitimate actions of the security forces of the Republic of Croatia clearly indicates that it is the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" which has no regard for the relevant Security Council resolutions. These resolutions have called for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. However, by stating that Croatian security forces committed "aggression" and that they "occupied" western Slavonia, Belgrade's foreign minister clearly indicates that the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" does not consider the western part of Slavonia as an integral part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia. In addition, Mr. Jovanovic refers to those individuals who are part of the Croatian Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia as "members of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina", thereby recognizing an illegal and self-declared entity on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

The position of Belgrade is, therefore, in contravention of relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and is opposed to the basic tenets of the United Nations, which are based on respect for international borders and the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through the use of force. Belgrade's position is also in direct opposition to the basic principle of the peace process in the region - that a lasting peace can only come about if there is mutual recognition by the successor States of the former Yugoslavia within their existing internationally recognized borders.

Mr. Jovanovic further states that "the principal goal of the armed action of Croatia was to annihilate the Serbian civilian population, terrorize it and complete the ethnic cleansing in Western Slavonia that Croatia began in 1991". Aside from not being true, this charge represents the most disdainful form of hypocrisy since it was Serbia and Montenegro which, from 1991 onwards, carried out the policy of ethnic cleansing which drove tens of thousands of ethnic Croats and other non-Serb citizens of Croatia from their homes and whose elite military units conducted the brutal assaults against Vukovar and Dubrovnik. It was because of its policy of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Security Council imposed sanctions against the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)".

I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the claims of Mr. Jovanovic are in conflict with your recent report pursuant to Security Council resolution 994 (1995) (S/1995/467 and Corr.1). That report states that the "Croatian Government has sought to encourage Serbs to remain" and that "the Croatian police have reportedly conducted themselves properly and with concern for the remaining Serbs". In regard to violations of human rights by government authorities, the report states that "these do not appear to have been systematic or part of a larger strategic design". These findings have been confirmed by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights as well as by reputable human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki.

I also wish to remind you that the problem in western Slavonia is a consequence of Serbian aggression carried out in 1991 by the Belgrade authorities with the purpose of creating a "Greater Serbia". In the course of this aggression, tens of thousands of ethnic Croats, Czechs and other non-Serb residents of western Slavonia were killed or driven from their homes, while many

ethnic Serb residents were forcibly resettled by Serb forces into regions that had been ethnically cleansed of non-Serbs and were designated to become part of "Greater Serbia". Following the perverse logic of ethnic cleansing, ethnic Serbs were often evacuated prior to an attack against civilian targets in ethnically mixed regions so that Serb forces could conduct indiscriminate shelling and wholesale random killings, safe in the knowledge that among the victimized population there were no ethnic Serbs. Once the non-Serb population in these areas was killed or terrorized into fleeing, the ethnic Serb evacuees would be returned to retake their property as well as that of the non-Serb residents who had been ethnically cleansed. However, not all the parts of western Slavonia in which the local Serb population was evacuated were eventually occupied by Serb forces, leaving many Croatian Serbs in the position of displaced persons or refugees. This policy by Serb forces and the hostilities initiated by their aggression - rather than any supposed ethnic cleansing campaign by the Croatian Government - was the primary reason for the displacement of many ethnic Serbs from western Slavonia in 1991. It should be noted that, both in 1991 as well as recently, many of these ethnic Serbs have been resettled in eastern Slavonia (where Croats and other non-Serbs constituted the absolute majority prior to the war) in order to solidify Serbian occupation of that region, which is adjacent to Serbia.

I wish to refer to the document which I had previously submitted to you (A/49/719) which provides information from various independent sources confirming the information mentioned in the above paragraph.

It is not our intention to imply that there were no ethnic Serbs from the western part of the Slavonia region of Croatia who could legitimately be considered refugees and who, in 1991, left for justifiable reasons related to hostilities there. However, I wish to state that the misfortune which has befallen them, in 1991 and now, is the direct consequence of the policies of the Belgrade authorities who armed and organized many of them to fight as their proxies against the Croatian Government and against their fellow Croatian citizens. Having been instigated by Belgrade to serve as an instrument in a genocidal campaign against their neighbours and having been influenced by an incessant anti-Croatian propaganda campaign from Belgrade, many of these ethnic Serbs - even though most are not personally responsible for the crimes committed - have decided to leave rather than face their surviving neighbours who are returning to live in the region. This has occurred despite the fact that the Croatian Government has undertaken measures to ensure their safety and has appealed to them to stay.

In this regard, I wish to reiterate the position of the Croatian Government that those ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia who have left western Slavonia - and who have not committed war crimes - are free to return and that they will have their personal safety and respect for their human rights guaranteed by the Croatian Government. At the same time, I wish to state that representatives of the Belgrade authorities who have conducted policies that have resulted in the misfortune of these people - not to mention of ethnic Croats and others - have no legal or moral right to speak on their behalf or to try to place blame on the Croatian Government for the criminal policies which they have themselves conducted.

I would be grateful for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under items 92 and 114 (c) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1995/532
30 June 1995

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 51
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 30 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of that letter and its annex, which contains the text of a statement made by H.E. Atay A. Raşit, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) İnal BATU
Permanent Representative

95-19822 (E) 030795 050795

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Annex

Letter dated 30 June 1995 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ addressed to the Secretary-General

In answer to recent allegations concerning the construction of a children's playground in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, contained in the letter addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative, Mr. Alecos Shambos (A/49/925-S/1995/511), I have the honour to bring to your attention the text of a statement made by H.E. Mr. Atay A. Raşit, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence, on 27 June 1995.

I shall be grateful if the present letter and its annex are circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York

Appendix

Statement by H.E. Mr. Atay A. Raşit dated 27 June 1995

Unfounded allegations are being put out by the Greek Cypriot side regarding the construction of a children's playground, which is already in progress in the area known as the Yiğitler (Rocas) Bastion in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. It is being observed that, in a deliberate attempt to exploit this issue, the Greek Cypriot administration is claiming that the excavations being carried out in connection with the playground are for military purposes.

These allegations are totally baseless. The work being done, which is totally within the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is aimed at creating a recreation area for the benefit of the civilian population.

In order not to harm the historical and natural fabric of the area, the infrastructure of the park has been planned underground. The work being carried out for this purpose is deemed necessary in order not to cause an unnecessary reduction in the size of the area.

Since the construction site is higher than the sewage system of the city, the excavations have to be deep so that the park's sewage system can be connected with that of the city. The soil that is being taken out will be used as refill upon completion of the work.

The reaction shown by the Greek Cypriot side regarding this matter is totally unwarranted and is aimed at diverting the attention of the world public opinion from the arming frenzy in which the Greek Cypriot side has been engaged. Since it is the Greek Cypriot side that is engaged in an intensive militarization campaign, baseless allegations of this nature cannot be other than diversionary tactics on the part of the Greek Cypriot side.

It is also known that the aim of the Greek Cypriot side is to prevent the implementation of the confidence-building measures package envisaged by the Secretary-General. It should be borne in mind, however, that, as long as the Greek Cypriot side continues its rigid and intransigent attitude and negative propaganda campaign against the Turkish Cypriot side, it will not be possible for the efforts in the direction of a lasting solution in the island to reach the desired results.

In the light of the above, we hope and expect that all concerned, above all the United Nations, will urge the Greek Cypriot side to abandon its adversarial attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot side and take positive steps towards reconciliation.

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30 June 1995

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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 955 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 5 of resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, I was asked to report periodically to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda. In my first report on 13 February 1995 (S/1995/134), I informed the Council of the steps envisaged for the practical implementation of the resolution and made my recommendation that Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, should be selected as the seat of the Tribunal. The present report describes the manner in which implementation has evolved since my last report, provides up-dated information regarding the arrangements being made for the seat of the Tribunal and sets out the current situation as regards the financing of the Tribunal.

II. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 955 (1994)

2. In my report of 13 February 1995, I described a two-phase approach to the implementation of the resolution. In a first phase, an investigative/prosecutorial unit was to be established in Kigali under the immediate supervision of the Deputy Prosecutor, Mr. Honoré Rakotomanana (Madagascar), who officially assumed his functions on 1 March 1995. In the second phase, it was envisaged that the seat of the Tribunal would be established at the location to be determined by the Council.

3. The establishment of a Prosecutor's office in Kigali was based on the decision taken by the Council in paragraph 6 of resolution 955 that an office will be established and proceedings conducted in Rwanda where feasible and appropriate.

4. For a variety of reasons, however, the Office in Kigali has yet to become fully operational. The uncertain budgetary situation made it difficult to attract and recruit qualified personnel; the core staff of the investigation section of the Office expressed concerns about the safety of personnel and the

security of documents; and premises for both accommodation and office needs were either unavailable or inadequate. The establishment of the Office in the first 10 weeks has, therefore, been more difficult than anticipated and until very recently it had no permanent presence in Kigali.

5. In the meantime, the process of investigation into serious violations of international humanitarian law and acts of genocide has been actively directed by the Deputy Prosecutor from Kigali and The Hague. The investigation, which focuses on approximately 400 identified suspects, is being conducted both in and outside Rwanda, notably in other African countries, Europe and North America, where the principal planners of the crime of genocide are believed to be located. The nature of the investigation in Europe and North America necessitates a temporary presence of investigators in the Prosecutor's Office in The Hague.

6. The prospects for a fully operational Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali have improved somewhat in recent weeks. As my Special Representative informed the Council on 5 June 1995, the general situation in Kigali has improved; notwithstanding the limited commitment authority that is the current basis of the financing of the Tribunal, certain key personnel can now be recruited, with the approval of the Controller, for up to one year; a small number of contributed personnel have also been deployed to Kigali; premises for both accommodation and office needs have been located, and with the reduction in size of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the space requirements of the Office can be met, even if the demand should grow beyond the number of posts currently foreseen. Notwithstanding the reduction of its force level, UNAMIR will continue to provide comprehensive support for the security of personnel and premises of the Prosecutor's Office, in accordance with resolutions 965 (1994) and 997 (1995). Barring any unforeseen difficulties of a practical or a security nature, it is expected that the Office in Kigali will now rapidly expand in size with a combination of recruited and contributed personnel.

7. Aware of the difficulties so far encountered in the early operation of the Prosecutor's Office in Kigali, I nevertheless wish to emphasize the considerable importance I attach to the presence of a fully operational Office in Kigali. Such a presence is not only mandated by the Security Council, but is also imperative for the socio-educational impact it would have on the people and Government of Rwanda. It has repeatedly been emphasized by the Government and the international community that the problem of impunity for crimes committed in Rwanda must not only be addressed but must also be seen to be addressed by the people most directly concerned.

8. The determination by the Council in resolution 977 (1995) of 22 February 1995 that, subject to the conclusion of appropriate arrangements, the seat of the International Tribunal will be at Arusha, opened the way to the election of the six trial judges by the General Assembly on 24 and 25 May 1995. Since the arrangements governing the seat of the Tribunal have yet to be completed, the first plenary session of the International Tribunal for Rwanda took place in The Hague between 26 and 30 June 1995. During this session the judges adopted the rules of procedure and evidence of the Tribunal and elected

Mr. Laïty Kama (Senegal) President and Mr. Yakov A. Ostrovsky (Russian Federation) Vice-President.

III. ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL

9. Following the adoption of resolution 977 (1995) on the seat of the Tribunal, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania confirmed its readiness to host the Tribunal in Arusha by a letter dated 10 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania addressed to the Legal Counsel.

10. A technical mission of the United Nations composed of representatives of the Buildings Management Service and the Purchase and Transportation Service of the United Nations Secretariat visited Arusha between 10 and 16 May 1995 to survey the premises of the Arusha International Conference Centre and the facilities available in Arusha to accommodate the Tribunal. The mission held discussions with the management of the Arusha International Conference Centre concerning arrangements that would be needed for obtaining suitable premises there. That was immediately followed, from 17 to 19 May 1995, by a mission composed of representatives of the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat to discuss with representatives of the Government a draft headquarters agreement and to discuss a draft lease agreement with representatives of the Arusha International Conference Centre. The Acting Chief of Administration of the Tribunal participated in both missions. The discussions of the draft agreements took place, ad referendum, on the basis of draft texts that had previously been prepared by the Office of Legal Affairs and made available to the Government. A record of discussion on both instruments was prepared at the close of the meetings.

11. While a number of issues remain to be resolved on both agreements, these are not thought to be insurmountable. For example, the outstanding issues in the draft headquarters agreement include the relationship of regulations made by and operative on the premises of the Tribunal with the laws and regulations of the United Republic of Tanzania; the exemptions of the Tribunal from certain indirect taxes; the status, privileges and immunities of locally recruited staff of the Tribunal; and the granting of visas free of charge and the use of United Nations travel documents. With respect to the draft lease agreement, all terms and conditions are subject to review and approval by the appropriate United Nations units, and issues such as the amount of rent, identification of the space and the timing of the availability of the premises to the Tribunal will have to be resolved. Other prerequisites for entering into a lease agreement include provision of the necessary funding, as well as completion of procedures and issuance of approvals required under the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules. It is hoped that it will be possible in the near future to finalize both a headquarters agreement and a lease agreement, subject to the necessary approvals by the respective organs of the Government and the United Nations.

12. It should also be noted that, in addition to the lease, arrangements, including contracting, will have to be made for the renovation, construction and repair work in the Arusha International Conference Centre in order to provide

the necessary facilities for the Tribunal. A report on these aspects from an architectural/planning consultant engaged by the United Nations has been received and is now being examined. The conclusion of a lease agreement and the contractual commitments for the renovation, construction and repair work are, of course, linked to the budget of the Tribunal, which is now in the final stages of preparation.

IV. FINANCING OF THE TRIBUNAL

13. The International Tribunal for Rwanda has thus far been operating on a combination of a commitment authority granted by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of up to $2.9 million and voluntary contributions in cash or kind provided by a small number of Governments. The total pledges and contributions made to the Trust Fund for the International Tribunal for Rwanda to date are slightly in excess of $1 million. In addition, at a specially convened meeting of the Rwanda Operational Support Group in Kigali on 19 May 1995, pledges in cash and in kind in the amount of some $6 to 7 million were made. A budgetary submission for the calendar year 1995 will be presented to the General Assembly during its current session. The approval by the General Assembly of a budget for the Tribunal will greatly facilitate the operational development of the Tribunal, particularly the Prosecutor's Office, permit recruitment of personnel to take place on an accelerated basis and the necessary lease and other contractual commitments to be entered into and enable the planning of a work programme for investigation, the preparation of indictments and the holding of trials.

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30 June 1995

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LETTER DATED 29 JUNE 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith for your kind attention, a letter from H.E. Sayed Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan, concerning the aggression of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Sudanese Province of Halaib.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hamid ALI ELTINAY
Chargé d'affaires

95-19829 (E) 010795 030795

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Annex

Letter dated 29 June 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan addressed to the President of he Security Council

Further to our previous letters, the last of which No: SUP/2-1/5 dated 20/7/94 regarding the aggression on the Sudanese territory of Halaib by the Arab Republic of Egypt, I have the honour to bring to your kind attention, the following:

On Tuesday, 27/6/95, and as a result of a tense military provocation in Halaib area, an exchange of fire broke between the Sudanese and Egyptian police forces specifically, at the outer stations of Bageih and Alnus. This exchange of fire resulted in the killing of the Officer in-Charge of the Sudanese Station, a lieutenant, and a private police officer. Other seven Sudanese policemen were injured, four of whom are in a serious condition.

The injured were evacuated to Brineis hospital inside the Egyptian territories, while the Egyptian troops took full control of these two stations, rounded thirty Sudanese policemen, and moved them to Abu Ramad after emptying their weapons.

The Sudanese Commander of Halaib met with the Egyptian Lieutenant General in the area who admitted that the whole problem was caused by his Deputy and the Officer second to him who could not control their forces.

Furthermore, the Egyptian military forces continued its escalation of events by attacking a coastal station North the city of Halaib. As a result a member of the Sudanese police forces in the station was killed and another one was injured, while the remaining members of the force withdrew to the city of Halaib which is currently under sieged by the Egyptian military forces.

It is noteworthy that in April 1992, a similar attack by the Egyptian Military Forces resulted in killing two Sudanese Policemen at Abu Ramad.

It should be noted that these serious developments are not isolated but are part and parcel of a feverished hostile campaign against the Sudan by the Egyptian high authorities and media.

President Mubarak, while addressing the so-called Sudanese National Democratic Alliance in Cairo on 28 June 1995, claimed that his Government is capable of changing the regime in Khartoum within only ten days if it has wished to do so.

Further, the Egyptian Information Minister while responding to a question by the BBC correspondent in Cairo on 28 June 1995, reaffirmed the support of his Government to the Sudanese opposition factions who have publicly declared their intentions to overthrow the Government of the Sudan as evidently reflected in the recent Asmara declaration.

The Sudanese Government has exerted all efforts and exhausted all available means to settle the Sudanese/Egyptian dispute over Halaib by peaceful means. Nevertheless, the Egyptian aggression has continued imposing a defacto occupation of the Sudanese province of Halaib, therefore creating a situation threatening the peace and security of the region.

In this regard, the Government of the Sudan, and as indicated in its previous notes, reiterates its position that the province of Halaib is a Sudanese territory that have continued eversince under the quite uninterrupted administration of the Sudanese Authorities, and is inhabited by Sudanese population.

The Government of the Sudan renews the call to the Security Council to meet its responsibilities in full and to give due consideration to the issue of the Egyptian aggression against the Sudan in the Sudanese province of Halaib by urging the Egyptian Government:

(a) To withdraw and rescind the Military presence and administrative measures it has taken in the Sudanese Province of Halaib and the area South of Argin.

(b) To make an immediate start towards resolving the dispute through negotiations by peaceful means based on the previous agreements between the two countries, and in accordance with Article 33 paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) To provide remedy and compensation to the families of the Sudanese nationals, victims of its aggression in the province of Halaib.

The Government of the Republic of the Sudan wishes to reiterate to the esteemed Council its full preparedness to exert all efforts in search of a peaceful resolution to the dispute with the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt without resort to the use of force and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Osman Mohamed TAHA
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of the Sudan
Khartoum

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S/1995/535
3 July 1995

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 23 June 1995 by the Deputy Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany stating that Mr. Antonius Eitel has been appointed representative of Germany on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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3 July 1995

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Item 114 (c) of the preliminary list*
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 3 July 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Government of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has continued the recent forceful mobilization of ethnic Serb citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who currently hold refugee status in the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as reported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international, as well as the Serbian independent media. This forceful mobilization has encompassed even those persons who were residents of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to becoming residents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These forcefully mobilized persons are being dispatched immediately to the aggressor's paramilitary units. In a similar way mobilized ethnic Serb citizens of the Republic of Croatia, currently residing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are being sent to the battlefields in the Bihać region.

This mobilization is being carried out by the military police of the Pale Serbs with the full cooperation and support of the police and military authorities of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina condemns these actions in the strongest terms. It considers them a most serious violation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's decision to close the border and cut off, inter alia, all the contacts with the leadership of Bosnian Serbs, and an act of

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

continuing aggression carried out against our country. These actions represent a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 943 (1994), 970 (1995) and 988 (1995).

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests that you undertake the appropriate measures in accordance with resolution 943 (1994), paragraphs 3 and 4, and recall the current regime of sanctions relief towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under item 114 (c) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/537
5 July 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Czech Republic, France, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, and in particular resolution 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994, resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995 and resolution 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995,

Calling upon all States and others concerned to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and international borders of all States in the region,

Noting the measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in particular those detailed in the annex to the Secretary-General's letter of 25 June 1995 to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/510), to maintain the effective closure of the international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs and noting with satisfaction that the cooperation of the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be good,

Reaffirming the importance of further efforts by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to enhance the effectiveness of the closure of the international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs,

Underlining the particular importance it attaches to there being no provision of military assistance, in terms of finance, equipment, coordination of air defences or recruitment of troops, to the Bosnian Serb forces,

Expressing appreciation for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY and of the ICFY Mission to the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and underlining the importance of the necessary resources being made available so as to strengthen the ICFY Mission's capacity to carry out its tasks,

Noting with satisfaction that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991 has adopted streamlined procedures for expediting its consideration of applications concerning legitimate humanitarian assistance, as well as a number of measures facilitating legitimate transshipments via the Danube river,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 (1994) shall be suspended until 18 September 1995;

2. Decides also that the arrangements referred to in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 988 (1995) shall continue to apply;

3. Renews its call for early mutual recognition between the States of the former Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders, recognition between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) being an important first step, and urges the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to take it;

4. Reaffirms its decision to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further steps with regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation;

5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/538
5 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JULY 1995 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to enclose herewith a joint letter dated 5 July 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhamed Sacirbey, and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, addressed to you.

We would kindly request your assistance in circulating this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIC
Chargé d'affaires of the
Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to the United Nations

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Croatia
to the United Nations

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Annex

Letter dated 5 July 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia

The Governments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Republic of Croatia attach the utmost importance to the need for timely and mutual recognition between all successor States of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders.

Furthermore, it is the strong position of the two Governments that simultaneous recognition among three successor States, specifically the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), should be the critical first step in restarting the currently stalled peace process in the region.

The present diplomatic process has been deadlocked by the refusal of the Serbs in Pale to accept the Contact Group plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Serbs in Knin to accept the UNCRO mandate for Croatia and by the renewed interference of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) into the affairs of our two countries. These and related developments pose a serious threat not only to the diplomatic process but also to the continued presence of United Nations peace-keepers in the region.

The Governments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Republic of Croatia reiterate their long-standing position that all future policy initiatives in the region should be refocused with the above important elements in mind, as well as the necessity to promote a true border closing between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Only then can the existing diplomatic process peacefully achieve the desired permanent and fair political settlement for the region.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Signed) Mate GRANIC
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Croatia

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/938
S/1995/539
5 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 39
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 5 July 1995 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the enclosed letter dated 3 July 1995 from H.E. Mr. Kresimir Zubak, President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, addressed to you.

May I ask for your kind assistance in distributing the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 39, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

ANNEX

Letter dated 3 July 1995 from Mr. Kresimir Zubak
addressed to the Secretary-General

I would like to inform you that, in my capacity as President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, my attempts to clarify certain ambiguities in connection with the rapid reaction force with the Commanders of UNPF in the former Yugoslavia have yielded little result.

We have still not received answers to the following questions: where would this force be stationed; what are the relevant facts concerning its mandate; what will be the length of its stay; what are the possible options of its later disposition; why is it insisted that its temporary deployment be exclusively on the territory under HVO (Croatian Defence Council) control?

My letter of 29 June to the UNPF Commander, General Janvier, in which I had requested clear answers to these questions, has not yet been responded to. I am confident that you fully understand the significance of these facts for our side, since giving consent that General Janvier has requested at a time when we do not know these facts could, for our side, result in the prejudging of options which, from the military-security standpoint, could be contrary to the strategic interests of the peoples who founded the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

You will recall that during the preceding time period we fully cooperated with the peace-keeping force of the United Nations. The peace-keeping force is almost completely stationed on the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation territory, even though it was understood that its mandate, according to initial resolutions of the United Nations, foresaw its distribution throughout the entire territory of the internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the present letter, as well as in the letter of 29 June that I forwarded to the Force Commander of UNPF in the former Yugoslavia, I have to once again emphasize our dissatisfaction with the one-sided steps by the UNPF Commanders who have already stationed a part of the additional forces in the area of Tomislavgrad, and who have continued to organize and prepare for the arrival of new units without the consent of the competent organs - contrary to the practice of thus far exemplary cooperation.

In the absence of the reply to my letter by the Force Commander of UNPF in the former Yugoslavia, I am forced to ask that you use your good offices, in your capacity as Secretary-General of the United Nations, and clarify as soon as possible all the questions that I have raised in the present letter. I would emphasize once again that we would expect more detailed information on the mandate of the additional force, advance plans of their precise deployment in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including for the longer-term period, and the number of personnel and accompanying military logistics, in order to give proper consent for the deployment of the new forces. We request the same concerning the status of the UNPF forces, which have already been stationed on the Federation territory. I also have the honour to inform you, as I have already conveyed to General Janvier, that these new forces already on the ground

may remain no more than 30 days. In order to maintain their presence after this time period, they must receive the full consent of the relevant organs, including of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Until such time that we receive clear and precise answers to the concerns expressed in the present letter, we will be unable to extend the approval for the United Nations forces in Tomislavgrad to perform military exercises.

Kresimir ZUBAK
President of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/540
6 July 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the excesses committed by Turkish forces in northern Iraq during the recent operations, which are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of international law, treaties and relations of good-neighbourliness between the two countries.

1. The raid launched by the Turkish armed forces on 20 March 1995 on northern Iraq was conducted by five brigades from the units operating in the southern region of Turkey, in addition to two brigades from the Special Forces and reinforcements from the Third Army, including the Fifth Infantry Brigade, units from gendarmerie formations, more than 500 tanks and 100 armoured personnel carriers, numerous Air Force fighter aircraft (F-16s and F-4s) and numerous helicopters.

2. The attack operations launched by the Turkish forces extended over the border strip and penetrated 40 kilometres inside Iraqi territory in some areas, covering Ibrahim al-Khalil, Zakho, Faysh Khabur, Amadiyah, the Matinah wa-Baykhayr mountain range, Sidkan, Qasrok, Darkar Ajam, Sarsank, Batufah and Kani Masi.

3. On 20 March 1995, Turkish aircraft bombed a number of villages in several areas in Sindi subdistrict, Zakho district, killing the citizen Arif Rasul Muhammad and wounding other citizens, Amin Rasul, Rasul Muhammad, Ahmad Muhammad Arif and Nariman Sa'id. On the same day, while searching the areas of Shara'ish and Darkar Ajam in Sindi subdistrict, Zakho district, the Turkish forces put pressure on the inhabitants for purposes of intelligence-gathering and stealing cash, gold and property, seized personal weapons, fired at citizens, causing the death of two, and seized five others, whom they carried off into Turkish territory.

On 30 March 1995, the Turkish forces seized four farmers near a village in Dohuk governorate, made them leave their farm and then fired at them, killing two.

On the same day, the Turkish forces searched a village in Sarsank subdistrict, held the inhabitants captive, and two days later released the women. On the next day, six male corpses were found on the ground near their village, and it was ascertained that they had been killed by the Turkish forces. Their names are as follows:

1. Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Sharif;

2. Isma'il Muhammad Sharif;

3. Muhammad Fattah Hasan;

4. Abd al-Qadir Izzat;

5. Sartib Abd al-Qadir Izzat;

6. Abdullah Zakari Hasan.

On 5 April 1995, a dispute arose between elements from the Turkish Society of the Red Crescent and relatives of the above-mentioned slain men. This developed into a shoot-out between the relatives of the slain men and the Turkish forces, resulting in the killing of five Iraqi citizens, namely:

1. Hasan Muhammad Sharif;

2. Umar Muhammad Sharif;

3. Hamid Muhammad Sharif;

4. Abu Bakr Muhammad Sharif;

5. Utman Kalli Zakari.

4. The Turkish forces set up armed check-points on the roads in Dohuk governorate, searched citizens and restricted their movement on the pretext of searching for elements belonging to the Kurdistan Workers' Party. Many citizens were seized, and their fate is still unknown. Check-points were set up on the following roads:

(a) The Sarsank-Amadiyah road;

(b) The Amadiyah-Shiladiza road;

(c) A number of locations on the Zakho-Batufah-Baykufah-Kani Masi high road.

5. The Turkish forces are preventing farmers from working on their farms in most villages and have carried out search operations in the villages and residential complexes of Zakho district, as follows:

(a) On 16 April 1995, they surrounded the residential complex in the Bersivi area of Sindi subdistrict, searched the houses of the complex after

ejecting the inhabitants, confiscated sheep and distributed them to the Turkish forces.

(b) They searched the village of Hayzawah on the Zakho-Batufah road, after cordoning it off, prevented citizens from engaging in their daily work and adopted schools in villages and townships as headquarters for their forces, putting a halt to any study activities.

(c) In the course of search operations in a number of villages in the Sindi plain, Zakho district, the Turkish forces demolished a number of citizens' houses, alleging that they had cooperated with elements belonging to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party.

(d) On 21 April 1995, the Turkish forces broke into the house of a citizen in Zakho district, attacked him and members of his family, confiscated his private automobile and also broke into a number of shops and carried off the proprietors for interrogation.

(e) On 22 April 1995, Turkish aircraft bombed the villages of Narmak and Riwan located to the north-east of the township of Batufah, Zakho district, 16 kilometres inside Iraqi territory. The bombing caused damage to a bridge over the Khabur river and to a number of houses in the two villages and set fire to farmland.

(f) On 22 April 1995, they confiscated a flock of sheep at the Darkar Ajam complex in Sindi subdistrict, Zakho district, and the sheep were distributed to the Turkish military units. The Turkish forces also occupied the Darkar Ajam boys' school and girls' school and turned the first into a detention centre for citizens from the area and the second into Turkish officers' quarters, which put a halt to studies in the two schools in question.

(g) On 23 April 1995, the Turkish Army authorities detained citizen Hamid Yunis Mulla Ahmad in Zakho district without justification.

6. The Turkish forces have also engaged in the following practices against the inhabitants of villages and residential complexes:

(a) Search of houses and detention and disappearance of men;

(b) Seizure of livestock and its utilization to transport ammunition and supplies to Turkish units in locations not easily accessible by highways;

(c) When searching the houses of citizens, Turkish soldiers confiscate personal property (cash and gold), inasmuch as the search operations are carried out after the occupants have been ejected from their homes and the men separated from the women;

(d) Seizure of private weapons belonging to citizens of remote areas, who keep them for self-defence and to protect their property and livestock against predatory animals.

These practices and acts of aggression directed against citizens of Dohuk governorate have caused them to live in a state of fear and terror throughout the period of the armed operations.

7. The camps of Turkish Kurdish refugees have been moved from the border areas to Atrush camp, and large numbers of Iraqi citizens have fled from the Iraqi villages of Banak, Barwari and Duski to towns and townships further inside Iraq because of the Turkish forces' invasion of the areas.

8. Although the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed in its statement of 5 May 1995 that the Turkish armed forces had withdrawn and returned to their bases on 2 May 1995, information indicates the presence of Turkish forces to the approximate strength of one brigade inside the Iraqi borders and scattered in small groups over some of the border outlets.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq protests vehemently against the violation of its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its civilian inhabitants and their property and requests you to intervene as dictated by your responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations in order to ensure the withdrawal of the remaining forces and to prevent the repetition of such acts of aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/541
6 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 29 June 1995, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 3390 (XXX) A and B on the question of Korea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would kindly arrange to have the memorandum circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 29 June 1995 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 3390 (XXX) A and B on the question of Korea

Establishment of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula

Twenty years have passed since the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 3390 (XXX) A and B of 18 November 1975, in which it was considered necessary to dissolve the United Nations Command, withdraw all foreign troops stationed in south Korea and replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement.

However, no single provision of the resolution has so far been implemented, nor has the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula been eased.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is issuing the present memorandum to make the Government's position clear concerning the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions.

Sincere efforts by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to implement the resolutions

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has put forward reasonable means and proposals and made every possible effort to implement the resolutions and achieve a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

The Government has paid particular attention to talks with the United States in its efforts to implement the resolutions and achieve peace. In its resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, considered it necessary to dissolve the United Nations Command and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in south Korea under the flag of the United Nations; called upon the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to replace the Korean Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement as a measure to ease tension and maintain and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula; requested the north and the south of Korea to ease the military confrontation in Korea, maintain a durable peace and promote the independent and peaceful reunification of the country by taking practical steps to observe the principles of the north-south joint statement, suspend the arms build-up, reduce the troops on both sides by a large margin on an equal footing, prevent armed conflict and refrain from the use of armed forces.

The ways to implement the resolutions can be sought only through talks with the United States, which is a direct party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, has its troops stationed in south Korea and controls the military and operational command.

In 1974, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed talks with the United States in order to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement. It has waited patiently, with the door open to dialogue, in the hope of getting a positive response, while making great efforts to implement the resolutions.

However, the United States Administration, together with the south Korean puppet army, has, since 1976, staged "team spirit" joint military exercises against us each year, mobilizing nuclear weapons instead of coming to the talks, and even cancelled the already proclaimed reduction plan of American troops in south Korea, in July 1979.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not given up its efforts to prevent war and maintain peace amid the ever-increasing threat of war.

On 10 January 1984, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made an epoch-making proposal to have tripartite talks among the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States and the south Korean authorities, with a view to reaching a peace agreement with the United States and a non-aggression declaration between the north and the south.

The demands of the United States were duly considered in our proposal for tripartite talks.

As to the tripartite talks, they had been initially proposed by the United States in 1976, further advocated in the United States-south Korea "joint statement" released in July 1979 during the trip of President Carter to south Korea, and again addressed in a speech made by President Reagan during his trip to south Korea in November 1983.

However, the United States authorities have refused our proposal for tripartite talks from the beginning and have taken the path of worsening the political and military confrontation.

With a view to easing the political and military tensions between the north and the south of Korea, though it is not a package solution guaranteeing peace, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 30 December 1986, set forth a new proposal to hold high-level political and military talks between the north and the south and made patient efforts for their realization.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward a proposal for arms reduction, including detailed measures to open the path leading to peace, and took active steps to do so, maintaining efforts to hold talks among the parties for maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula.

On 23 July 1987, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed reducing the troops in the north and the south to less than 100,000 each, in three phases, while maintaining a balance of armed forces on the Korean peninsula by means of reduction, not reinforcement. Accordingly, the Government called for a phased withdrawal of United States forces from south

Korea, and as a show of good faith, it unilaterally discharged 100,000 soldiers by the end of 1987.

On 7 November 1988, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea introduced a comprehensive peace proposal in the form of a phased arms reduction to realize the principle of guaranteeing peace and the withdrawal of United States troops in parallel with arms reduction and verification in the north and the south.

Again, on 31 May 1990, it set forth a broad proposal for universal and complete arms reduction and peace on the Korean peninsula, including confidence-building, arms reduction, withdrawal of foreign troops and the adoption of a non-aggression declaration between the north and the south.

Owing to the sustained generosity and sincere efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, high-level talks between the north and the south were held in September 1990 to ease the political and military confrontation between the north and the south. After several talks, the agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and exchange between the north and the south was adopted in December 1991.

The north-south Joint-Military Committee was organized to supervise the implementation of the non-aggression agreement. As a result of the agreement, a substantial foundation for preserving peace between the north and the south has been laid.

The only questions remaining to be resolved are those between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States on implementing General Assembly resolutions 3390 (XXX) A and B for a durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

If the United States had accepted the fair and aboveboard proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the resolutions would have been implemented long ago, the danger of war removed from the Korean peninsula and a lasting peace settled in the region.

Establishment of a new peace mechanism without further delay

The establishment of a new peace mechanism in place of the outdated armistice system on the Korean peninsula is an important matter that should not be further delayed.

The United States, a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement, far from observing it, has systematically wrecked and violated it.

Shortly after the Armistice Agreement was signed and its implementation began, the United States set out to abrogate unilaterally paragraph 13 D, the nucleus of the Agreement. According to paragraph 13 D, the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition were to cease, and it stipulated that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, should conduct supervision and inspection of the implementation in that respect.

The United States, right after signing the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953, began to introduce into south Korea operational materials on a large scale, pursuing war preparations.

During the period from the cease-fire to 15 April 1954, the exposed operational materials alone deployed into south Korea by the United States amounted to 177 combat aircraft, 465 cannons and 1,365 machine-guns of different calibre.

When the shipment of its operational materials had been brought to light one after the other, the United States unilaterally informed the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams monitoring the introduction of operational materials in south Korea, at the seventieth meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), on 31 May 1956, that their activities would be prohibited and forced them to withdraw in June 1956.

As a result, the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams that were established and were carrying out their mandate according to the Armistice Agreement ceased to exist.

At the seventy-fifth meeting of MAC, on 21 June 1957, the United States declared an abrogation of the observance of paragraph 13 D of the Armistice Agreement.

Thus, the main legal component in the Armistice Agreement to prevent the recurrence of war disappeared and the armistice agreement and the cease-fire mechanism have since become powerless.

The 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1994 American helicopter incident that brought the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war could be solved only through direct talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, not through the armistice system.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, whose main mandate was to monitor the introduction of operational materials, in actuality had nothing to do owing to the abrogation of paragraph 13 D of the Armistice Agreement by the United States.

The United States could therefore introduce into south Korea up-to-date weapons, including nuclear weapons, freely.

The United States abrogation of paragraph 13 D of the Armistice Agreement means the abrogation of paragraph 61 of the Agreement, in which it is stipulated that the Agreement is to be revised and supplemented only by agreement between the two sides. It is the destruction of the legal foundation for maintaining the Armistice Agreement.

Moreover, in March 1991, the United States paralysed MAC, the only supervisory body to implement the Armistice Agreement, by appointing to the post of "senior member" of MAC a "general" of the puppet army of south Korea, which is not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, but doggedly went against its signing and has no real power in the maintenance of the cease-fire.

Under those conditions, the Korean People's Army took steps to recall its members from MAC and the delegation of the Chinese People's Volunteers was also compelled to withdraw.

With the Korean-Chinese side completely withdrawn from MAC, the delegations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission relying on MAC had to be pulled out.

Owing to the irresponsible acts of the United States in the past, the Korean Armistice Agreement has now become a mere scrap of paper, with no content, only form, and the armistice supervisory mechanism, a tool for fulfilling the Agreement, has remained like a house without pillars.

It has not been possible to rehabilitate and revive the armistice system and there is no other way but to replace it with a new system. With the armistice system in place on the Korean peninsula having huge armed forces across the military demarcation line, any trivial accidental occurrence cannot be ruled out.

The immediate task assigned to the real signatories to the Armistice Agreement is to provide institutional machinery to prevent the recurrence of war in Korea.

Removal of the insignia "United Nations forces" from the caps of the United States forces present in south Korea

The "United Nations forces" present in south Korea, a legal party according to the Korean Armistice Agreement, are an anachronistic creature produced by the United States, which is abusing the name of the United Nations to justify the Korean war after unleashing it.

As to the unreasonable resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950, which is claimed to be the legal foundation of the "United Nations forces" in south Korea, it simply recommended that the "assistance" provided by United Nations Members should be used by the "United States-led combined forces command".

The "United Nations Command" in south Korea is a camouflaged one created by the United States, at its disposition, not by any resolution of the United Nations.

In the wake of the armistice, all the countries, except the United States, that took part in the Korean war have withdrawn their troops at the instruction of their Governments, not by the resolutions of the United Nations.

The "United Nations Command" in south Korea means the United States command, and the "United Nations forces" are United States forces.

In this regard, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his letter of 24 June 1994 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said that the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" falls under the jurisdiction of the United States Government since the

unified command had been established under the United States, not as a body under the Council's own jurisdiction.

Peace cannot be guaranteed on the Korean peninsula by the old armistice system with the "United Nations forces" as a concerned party.

The "United Nations Command", an aggressive tool in the era of the cold war, must be dissolved without delay. Its dissolution is recommended in a resolution of the United Nations and is a requirement of the international peace forces.

Even the United States-side resolution adopted at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly carried the idea that negotiations for new measures to replace the Armistice Agreement should be held and the "United Nations Command" dissolved when an alternative proposal was made.

It can be said that an alternative proposal and conditions to dismantle the "United Nations Command" have been initiated as the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea advanced a new proposal to establish a peace mechanism in April 1994 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States Agreed Framework was concluded in October 1994 and is at the stage of implementation.

The United States should discharge its obligations and role in maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula by taking a decisive step to withdraw its troops from south Korea and conclude a peace agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as stipulated in General Assembly resolutions 3390 (XXX) A and B.

Should the United States not be in a position to do so at once, it should at least dissolve the "United Nations Command", as stipulated in both resolutions.

However, if the United States ignores and turns its back on our just proposal, which deserves to be duly accepted, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be forced to take the necessary measures one by one and unilaterally in order to remove completely the remains of the cold war in Korea.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/541*
14 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 29 June 1995, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of a resolution on the question of Korea at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would kindly arrange to have the memorandum circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

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Annex

Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 29 June 1995 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of a resolution on the question of Korea at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly

Establishment of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula

Twenty years have passed since the adoption of a resolution to dissolve the United Nations Command, withdraw all foreign troops stationed in south Korea and replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement.

However, no single provision of the resolution has so far been implemented, nor has the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula been eased.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is issuing the present memorandum to make the Government's position clear concerning the implementation of the resolution.

I. Sincere efforts by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to implement the resolution

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has put forward reasonable means and proposals and made every possible effort to implement the resolution and achieve a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

The Government has paid particular attention to talks with the United States in its efforts to implement the resolution and achieve peace. In its resolution, the General Assembly firstly demanded the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in south Korea under the flag of the United Nations; secondly called upon the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to replace the Korean Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement as a measure to ease tension and maintain and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula; and thirdly requested the north and the south of Korea to ease the military confrontation in Korea, maintain a durable peace and promote the independent and peaceful reunification of the country by taking practical steps to observe the principles of the north-south joint statement, suspend the arms build-up, reduce the troops on both sides by a large margin on an equal footing, prevent armed conflict and refrain from the use of armed forces.

The ways to implement the resolution can be sought only through talks with the United States, which is a direct party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, has its troops stationed in south Korea and controls the military and operational command.

In 1974, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed talks with the United States in order to replace the Armistice

Agreement with a peace agreement. It has waited patiently, with the door open to dialogue, in the hope of getting a positive response, while making great efforts to implement the resolution.

However, the United States Administration, together with the south Korean puppet army, has, since 1976, staged "team spirit" joint military exercises against us each year, mobilizing nuclear weapons instead of coming to the talks, and even cancelled the already proclaimed reduction plan of American troops in south Korea, in July 1979.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not given up its efforts to prevent war and maintain peace amid the ever-increasing threat of war.

On 10 January 1984, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made an epoch-making proposal to have tripartite talks among the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States and the south Korean authorities, with a view to reaching a peace agreement with the United States and a non-aggression declaration between the north and the south.

The demands of the United States were duly considered in our proposal for tripartite talks.

As to the tripartite talks, they had been initially proposed by the United States in 1976, further advocated in the United States-south Korea "joint statement" released in July 1979 during the trip of President Carter to south Korea, and again addressed in a speech made by President Reagan during his trip to south Korea in November 1983.

However, the United States authorities have refused our proposal for tripartite talks from the beginning and have taken the path of worsening the political and military confrontation.

With a view to easing the political and military tensions between the north and the south of Korea, though it is not a package solution guaranteeing peace, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 30 December 1986, set forth a new proposal to hold high-level political and military talks between the north and the south and made patient efforts for their realization.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward a proposal for arms reduction, including detailed measures to open the path leading to peace, and took active steps to do so, maintaining efforts to hold talks among the parties for maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula.

On 23 July 1987, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed reducing the troops in the north and the south to less than 100,000 each, in three phases, while maintaining a balance of armed forces on the Korean peninsula by means of reduction, not reinforcement. Accordingly, the Government called for a phased withdrawal of United States forces from south Korea, and as a show of good faith, it unilaterally discharged 100,000 soldiers by the end of 1987.

On 7 November 1988, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea introduced a comprehensive peace proposal in the form of a phased arms reduction to realize the principle of guaranteeing peace and the withdrawal of United States troops in parallel with arms reduction and verification in the north and the south.

Again, on 31 May 1990, it set forth a broad proposal for universal and complete arms reduction and peace on the Korean peninsula, including confidence-building, arms reduction, withdrawal of foreign troops and the adoption of a non-aggression declaration between the north and the south.

Owing to the sustained generosity and sincere efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, high-level talks between the north and the south were held in September 1990 to ease the political and military confrontation between the north and the south. After several talks, the agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and exchange between the north and the south was adopted in December 1991.

The north-south Joint-Military Committee was organized to supervise the implementation of the non-aggression agreement. As a result of the agreement, a substantial foundation for preserving peace between the north and the south has been laid.

The questions remain to be resolved only between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States in implementing the resolution for a durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

If the United States had accepted the fair and aboveboard proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the resolution would have been implemented long ago, the danger of war removed from the Korean peninsula and a lasting peace settled in the region.

II. Establishment of a new peace mechanism without further delay

1. The establishment of a new peace mechanism in place of the outdated armistice system on the Korean peninsula is an important matter that should not be further delayed.

The United States, a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement, far from observing it, has systematically wrecked and violated it.

Shortly after the Armistice Agreement was signed and its implementation began, the United States set out to abrogate unilaterally paragraph 13 D, the nucleus of the Agreement. According to paragraph 13 D, the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition were to cease, and it stipulated that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, should conduct supervision and inspection of the implementation in that respect.

The United States, right after signing the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953, began to introduce into south Korea operational materials on a large scale, pursuing war preparations.

During the period from the cease-fire to 15 April 1954, the exposed operational materials alone deployed into south Korea by the United States amounted to 177 combat aircraft, 465 cannons and 1,365 machine-guns of different calibre.

When the shipment of its operational materials had been brought to light one after the other, the United States unilaterally informed the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams monitoring the introduction of operational materials in south Korea, at the seventieth meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), on 31 May 1956, that their activities would be prohibited and forced them to withdraw in June 1956.

As a result, the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams that were established and were carrying out their mandate according to the Armistice Agreement ceased to exist.

At the seventy-fifth meeting of MAC, on 21 June 1957, the United States declared an abrogation of the observance of paragraph 13 D of the Armistice Agreement.

Thus, the main legal component in the Armistice Agreement to prevent the recurrence of war disappeared and the armistice agreement and the cease-fire mechanism have since become powerless.

The 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1994 American helicopter incident that brought the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war could be solved only through direct talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, not through the armistice system.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, whose main mandate was to monitor the introduction of operational materials, in actuality had nothing to do owing to the abrogation of paragraph 13 D of the Armistice Agreement by the United States.

The United States could therefore introduce into south Korea up-to-date weapons, including nuclear weapons, freely.

The United States abrogation of paragraph 13 D of the Armistice Agreement means the abrogation of paragraph 61 of the Agreement, in which it is stipulated that the Agreement is to be revised and supplemented only by agreement between the two sides. It is the destruction of the legal foundation for maintaining the Armistice Agreement.

Moreover, in March 1991, the United States paralysed MAC, the only supervisory body to implement the Armistice Agreement, by appointing to the post of "senior member" of MAC a "general" of the puppet army of south Korea, which is not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, but doggedly went against its signing and has no real power in the maintenance of the cease-fire.

Under those conditions, the Korean People's Army took steps to recall its members from MAC and the delegation of the Chinese People's Volunteers was also compelled to withdraw.

With the Korean-Chinese side completely withdrawn from MAC, the delegations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission relying on MAC had to be pulled out.

Owing to the irresponsible acts of the United States in the past, the Korean Armistice Agreement has now become a mere scrap of paper, with no content, only form, and the armistice supervisory mechanism, a tool for fulfilling the Agreement, has remained like a house without pillars.

It has not been possible to rehabilitate and revive the armistice system and there is no other way but to replace it with a new system. With the armistice system in place on the Korean peninsula having huge armed forces across the military demarcation line, any trivial accidental occurrence cannot be ruled out.

The immediate task assigned to the real signatories to the Armistice Agreement is to provide institutional machinery to prevent the recurrence of war in Korea.

2. The United States must remove the insignia "United Nations Forces" from the caps of its forces present in south Korea.

The "United Nations forces" present in south Korea, a legal party according to the Korean Armistice Agreement, are an anachronistic creature produced by the United States, which is abusing the name of the United Nations to justify the Korean war after unleashing it.

As to the unreasonable resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950, which is claimed to be the legal foundation of the "United Nations forces" in south Korea, it simply recommended that the "assistance" provided by United Nations Members should be used by the "United States-led combined forces command".

The "United Nations Command" in south Korea is a camouflaged one created by the United States, at its disposition, not by any resolution of the United Nations.

In the wake of the armistice, all the countries, except the United States, that took part in the Korean war have withdrawn their troops at the instruction of their Governments, not by the resolution of the United Nations.

The "United Nations Command" in south Korea means the United States command, and the "United Nations forces" are United States forces.

In this regard, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his letter of 24 June 1994 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said that the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" falls under the jurisdiction of the United States Government since the

unified command had been established under the United States, not as a body under the Council's own jurisdiction.

Peace cannot be guaranteed on the Korean peninsula by the old armistice system with the "United Nations forces" as a concerned party.

The "United Nations Command", an aggressive tool in the era of the cold war, must be dissolved without delay. Its dissolution is recommended in a resolution of the United Nations and is a requirement of the international peace forces.

Even the United States-side resolution adopted at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly carried the idea that negotiations for new measures to replace the Armistice Agreement should be held and the "United Nations Command" dissolved when an alternative proposal was made.

It can be said that an alternative proposal and conditions to dismantle the "United Nations Command" have been initiated as the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea advanced a new proposal to establish a peace mechanism in April 1994 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States agreed framework was concluded in October 1994 and is at the stage of implementation.

The United States should discharge its obligations and role in maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula by taking a decisive step to withdraw its troops from south Korea and conclude a peace agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as stipulated in the General Assembly resolution.

Should the United States not be in a position to do so at once, it should at least dissolve the "United Nations Command", as stipulated in the General Assembly resolution.

However, if the United States ignores and turns its back on our just proposal, which deserves to be duly accepted, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be forced to take the necessary measures one by one and unilaterally in order to remove completely the remains of the cold war in Korea.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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17 July 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 29 June 1995, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of a resolution on the question of Korea at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would kindly arrange to have the memorandum circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

** Second reissue for technical reasons.

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Annex

Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 29 June 1995 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of a resolution on the question of Korea at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly

Establishment of a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula

Twenty years have passed since the adoption in November 1975, at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, of a resolution to dissolve the United Nations Command, withdraw all foreign troops stationed in south Korea and replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement.

However, no single provision of the resolution has so far been implemented, nor has the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula been eased.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is issuing the present memorandum to make the Government's position clear concerning the implementation of the resolution.

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The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has put forward reasonable means and proposals and made every possible effort to implement the resolution and achieve a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

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The ways to implement the resolution can be sought only through talks with the United States, which is a direct party to the Korean Armistice Agreement, has its troops stationed in south Korea and controls the military and operational command.

In 1974, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed talks with the United States in order to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement. It has waited patiently, with the door open to dialogue, in the hope of getting a positive response, while making great efforts to implement the resolution.

However, the United States Administration, together with the south Korean puppet army, has, since 1976, staged "team spirit" joint military exercises against us each year, mobilizing nuclear weapons instead of coming to the talks, and even cancelled the already proclaimed reduction plan of American troops in south Korea, in July 1979.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not given up its efforts to prevent war and maintain peace amid the ever-increasing threat of war.

On 10 January 1984, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made an epoch-making proposal to have tripartite talks among the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States and the south Korean authorities, with a view to reaching a peace agreement with the United States and a non-aggression declaration between the north and the south.

The demands of the United States were duly considered in our proposal for tripartite talks.

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With a view to easing the political and military tensions between the north and the south of Korea, though it is not a package solution guaranteeing peace, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 30 December 1986, set forth a new proposal to hold high-level political and military talks between the north and the south and made patient efforts for their realization.

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Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, should conduct supervision and inspection of the implementation in that respect.

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The 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1994 American helicopter incident that brought the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war could be solved only through direct talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, not through the armistice system.

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The "United Nations forces" present in south Korea, a legal party according to the Korean Armistice Agreement, are an anachronistic creature produced by the United States, which is abusing the name of the United Nations to justify the Korean war after unleashing it.

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Should the United States not be in a position to do so at once, it should at least dissolve the "United Nations Command", as stipulated in both United Nations resolutions.

However, if the United States ignores and turns its back on our just proposal, which deserves to be duly accepted, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will be forced to take the necessary measures one by one and unilaterally in order to remove completely the remains of the cold war in Korea.